A Brief Account of the Negotiations over the Gutian Incident in Fujian

Jun 2018 · history

Disclaimer: This post was originally written in Chinese and translated into English by GPT-5.2.

I. The Occurrence of the Incident

At six or seven o’clock in the early morning of August 1, 1895, a murder case occurred in two Western-style houses on Mount Huashan in Gutian County, Fujian Province. A group of members of the “Zhaihui” (also called the “Caihui,” which the Qing government referred to as “vegetable bandits”) wielded weapons such as guns, spears, swords, tridents, and broadswords, and beat, stabbed, and hacked the Sharpe family inside the houses. In the end, a total of 11 people were killed and 7 were injured, all of them British, and one American woman suffered minor injuries. Of the 11 killed, one died the next day while being transported to Fuzhou for medical treatment. This murder case is generally called the Gutian Missionary Case, the Gutian Massacre, or the Huashan Massacre; this article will uniformly refer to it as the Gutian Missionary Case.

II. Reactions of All Parties

Two days after the incident, on the 3rd, news of the Gutian Missionary Case reached Fuzhou, immediately arousing indignation among foreigners in Fuzhou, especially foreign merchants, and also drawing close attention from the U.S. government. U.S. Secretary of State Adee wrote to the U.S. minister in Beijing, Denby, asking him to immediately request that the Chinese government provide protection at once to the injured American woman. While requesting protection for American citizens from the Zongli Yamen, Denby also expressed the U.S. government’s condemnation of the incident[1]. The U.S. government later also dispatched the gunboat Detroit to the mouth of the Min River at Mawei to stage a demonstration; it arrived at the Min River on the 12th and anchored at the Luoxing Pagoda anchorage. Beyond the government level, protests in civil society were also continuous. The New York Tribune clamored to place China “under bombardment,” subjecting it to “the severest punishment”[2]. Foreigners residing throughout China also, “regardless of what country they belonged to, officials, gentry, scholars, and merchants formed associations, each expressing their intolerance,” and the foreigners in Shanghai were even more intense, calling that “this case can no longer be forgiven, nor can the collection of compensation silver suffice to settle it; therefore, aside from severe punishment there is no other thought,” and the “severe punishment” here even included “ceding territory and boundaries”[3]. On the 4th, Shenbao published the first report on the Gutian incident[4].

On the Chinese government side, under pressure from public opinion, the Fuzhou General Qingyu did not report the occurrence of the incident to the Zongli Yamen until the 4th. But due to blocked information, the Fuzhou authorities did not know “what country’s church the Huashan locality belonged to, whether there were foreigners inside, how many were injured, and whether the church was damaged,” and could only dispatch “Qin Bingzhi of Fuzhou Prefecture to rush there to investigate and handle it”[5]. The Qing government also attached great importance to it, and the next day telegraphed back an order inquiring in detail about the incident and “instructed Qingyu and others to investigate and memorialize the reasons for the Gutian Caihui’s anti-foreign-religion actions and to send troops to arrest the offenders,” to protect churches and residences everywhere, and that “it is essential that no further incidents arise”[6]. On the 7th, after receiving the Fuzhou authorities’ report on the details of the incident on the 6th, the Qing government still telegraphed to ask, “when the foreigners were escorted by braves to the provincial capital, one person died on the way; what country’s person was this, and why did he die”[7], showing the degree of concern.

On August 8, Li Hongzhang, then in Britain, telegraphed back: “The British, upon hearing this news, are extremely indignant throughout the country. It is heard that the British minister has already wired the naval commander to go to Fujian.”[8] Previously, on the 4th, the Zongli Yamen had already telegraphed the Chinese minister to Britain, Gong Zhaoyuan, formally informing the British Foreign Office, but the British authorities had not yet promptly stated a position[9]. Under domestic public opinion pressure, on the 8th, Prime Minister Salisbury first made clear the government’s position, demanding that the Chinese government severely punish the perpetrators and protect foreign missionaries, and also dispatched the consul stationed in Fujian to go to the place in Gutian where trouble had occurred to investigate and handle it, escorted by Chinese troops. Under pressure from all sides, on the 9th, the Guangxu Emperor issued an imperial edict in the Peking Gazette, on the one hand expressing the Chinese government’s friendliness toward foreigners and equal treatment, “ordering the governors-general, governors, and other officials of all provinces to instruct their subordinates that they must exert real effort to protect churches,” and on the other hand warning residents not to use pretexts to stir up trouble and not to spread or believe rumors[10].

On August 12, Shanghai’s North China Daily News published “The Gutian Massacre” written by Fuzhou pastor George B. Smyth[11], giving the first detailed report of the entire sequence of events and causes of the Gutian Missionary Case. The article held that the Gutian Missionary Case was “the most appalling massacre of foreigners in China to date,” and in addition to demanding severe punishment of the perpetrators, it also demanded severe punishment of those who, when the missionary case occurred, “not only gave the victims no help, but instead took part in looting, taking away anything valuable from the house that was still burning,” to prevent similar atrocities from recurring in the future. However, the article believed that the cause of the incident was not a deliberate targeting of foreigners, but rather that the anti-government Zhaihui attributed the government’s suppression to “blaming Mr. Sharpe and other foreigners, and concluding that these missionaries provided the funds needed to move troops”[12]. Therefore, they regarded this Gutian Missionary Case as an act of retaliation, whose essence was still anti-government.

Telegraphic exchanges in Chinese-foreign diplomatic negotiations became even more frequent. Through telegrams between the governor-general, the Fujian authorities’ general, the Fuzhou commissioners, the customs office and the British and American consuls and ministers, as well as the British and American foreign offices, and also with the minister to Britain Gong Zhaoyuan, a consensus was reached on the next steps to resolve the incident, and a plan was made to send an investigation group to Gutian.

The British and American authorities and the Qing government reached a unified opinion: an investigation group for the Gutian Missionary Case was formed by the British consul in Fuzhou Robert William Mansfield, vice-consul E.L.B. Allen, U.S. consul in Fuzhou J. Countney Hixson, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander J.S. Newell, Methodist Episcopal doctor J.J. Gyegory, naval ensign Waldo Evans, Dr. E.G. Hart, as well as Anglican pastors Banister William and L.H. Star[13]. On August 13 the investigation group went to Gutian. The Fujian local authorities, for their part, appointed Zhu Shou, a supervising officer of the customs office, and deputy general Zhu Bicheng to lead trained troops to escort them from the provincial capital to Gutian.

On the 16th, the investigation group arrived in Gutian. From this point, the Chinese-foreign negotiations over the Gutian Missionary Case formally entered the stage of investigation and trial.

III. Investigation and Trial of the Case

From their arrival in Gutian on August 16 until the investigation group withdrew back to Fuzhou on October 26 (arriving the next day), the Anglo-American consular investigation group spent a total of 61 days in Gutian. Of these, starting from August 2, a total of 28 days were used for the trial of the offenders. Over the whole process of investigation and trial, 207 people were arrested; among them, the cases of 88 were tried in the presence of the investigative committee[14].

Before the investigation group arrived, the county magistrate Wang Rulin and deputy general Tang Youde were later dismissed and retained for pursuing arrests; Yi Jian was sent to replace them and arrived in Gutian on August 5; the Fuzhou prefect Qin Bingzhi also arrived on August 7. The day after the investigation group arrived, Prefect Qin Bingzhi came to visit. The next day (the 18th), Magistrate Yi Jian came to visit as well. On the 19th, the investigation group returned their visits.

On the 17th, the day after the investigation group arrived, the British Foreign Office supplemented and reiterated its position in the House of Commons: “It is necessary to wait until the perpetrators are arrested and punished before discussing indemnities.”[15] On the same day, the British and American ministers respectively telegraphed the two consuls in Gutian, emphasizing that “the most important thing is that those arrested and executed are the real criminals”[16]. The United States in this incident had only one American woman injured; in letters of the 23rd and 24th from the Zongli Yamen to the U.S. minister in Beijing, Denby, it said, “Since Americans suffered no losses in Gutian, we respectfully ask the American minister to consider whether it is necessary for the American consul to go to Gutian to observe the trial.” But Denby, in his reply telegram, still insisted on participating in the trial on the grounds of the safety of American citizens in China, and considered that the Zongli Yamen’s request came too late[17]. On the 31st, the U.S. Secretary of State wrote to the U.S. minister Yang Ru, reiterating that the U.S. “government will join with Britain in investigating the Gutian disturbance only to the extent required to protect the personal safety and property interests of American citizens, and will in no way assist Britain in realizing its ulterior political aims.”[18] Similar wording already appeared in Secretary of State Adee’s telegram of the 12th to Denby: while calling for consultation with Britain and the British minister and seeking cooperation, it insisted on the principle that “no matter how important to British interests, so long as it has nothing to do with the United States, involvement should be avoided”[19].

In the subsequent process of the specific investigation and trial of the case, due to differing positions, there were many disputes between the Chinese side and the British and American side.

In the second half of August, while the interrogations were still ongoing, Magistrate Yi Jian issued a proclamation, attaching certain instructions to the heads of the lijia mutual-responsibility system, specifically mentioning Zhaihui believers and Christians—saying that as long as the former behaved and obeyed the law in the future, they could be allowed to register and participate in the lijia; the latter could also participate, but their birth year, month, and day and when they entered the religion had to be registered in the files. The British and American side believed that this proclamation had an extremely bad effect: it immediately restored the status of the Zhaihui adherents, obstructed the pursuit and arrest of offenders, poured cold water on enthusiasm for the lijia, and also aroused suspicion in Christians’ minds because they were treated as a special class and entered in a separate register. The investigation group objected to the proclamation and the attached instructions, demanded that they be revoked and that another proclamation be issued, and insisted that the new proclamation must not mention Christians; at the same time, registration of Zhaihui adherents should be prohibited, and only after a one-year probation period and issuance of proof of determination to abide by law and discipline, and only after consultation with the consul, could the ban be lifted. On September 5, the local government submitted another draft, and the investigation group felt satisfied. But by September 12, the original proclamation had not been revoked, and the agreed-upon proclamation had not been promulgated either. On the 24th, Magistrate Yi Jian issued a second proclamation, still following the old pattern[20]. This made the investigation group very unhappy and believe that there were “obstructions everywhere.”

On August 30, the Fuzhou General Qingyu and others memorialized to the Qing government the specific circumstances of the current handling of the Gutian Caihui injuring people and killing foreigners, and said that they had captured the principal offenders Liu Xiangxing and Zhang Chi, and the pseudo “military adviser” Zheng Jiujiu[21]. On the same day, the U.S. minister in Beijing, Denby, said in a telegram to the Zongli Yamen that the American consul believed that “the Chinese officials currently responsible for the investigation locally have very limited authority, and all important matters must be reported to the governor-general for instructions.” Therefore, in incidents such as disturbances, the investigative trial court could be granted full authority, and the effect of the investigation would be much greater[22]. He was not satisfied with the current progress of the case. On September 5, Denby again reiterated this U.S. government request to the Zongli Yamen, and at the same time requested an order to dispatch a high-ranking official to Gutian and to grant the committee final adjudicatory power[23]. On the same day, British consul Mansfield, in his “Report on the conduct of the Chinese officials of Fujian in connection with the Gutian County Huashan massacre—resulting in the death of eleven British subjects and injury to others,” also reached the same conclusion. He even believed that the origin of the disturbance was indirectly caused by the authorities’ weakness (that is, he believed that local officials had no conspiratorial relationship with the perpetrators of the missionary case; on this point they were completely innocent)[24].

The Fuzhou General Qingyu, however, believed that this was caused by the American consul and the investigation group being incited by the church members and seeking private revenge, and said in a telegram to the Zongli Yamen the next day (the 6th): “Regarding the Huashan disturbance, Pastor Lu said there were sixty or seventy people, and also said a hundred people. Yet the consul produced a list reaching more than two hundred; it is thus evident that church members, harboring grievances, have sent in names. Offenders now captured have already reached a hundred; upon interrogation there are confirmed confessions from thirteen, and there are still ten whose cases have not yet been decided. All are based on telegraphed reports; the detailed confessions have not yet been sent. If compensation is made as ordered, there will be surplus, not deficiency. If one wishes to make great demands according to the list and carry out executions wantonly, that is absolutely impossible. I have now dispatched Xu Xingyi to Gutian to consult with the consul on handling. When there is a settled view, I will telegraph again.”[25] The American side felt that the Chinese government intended to smooth things over; in a telegram of the 13th from U.S. consul Hixson to Denby it recorded the verbal instruction brought by Daotai Xu Xingyi from the governor-general: “Tell me exactly how many heads you want, and I can immediately make that many heads fall, so long as this case can thereby be finally concluded.”[26] The next day, Denby in a telegram to the Zongli Yamen again reiterated that “punishment of the offenders is the most important matter.”[27]

In early September, during the interrogations, about 48 suspects were released from custody. Some of those released threatened passersby. The investigation group claimed that, upon investigation, it found that among those released, several had a conspiratorial relationship with the attack on Huashan, and so it demanded that these released persons be arrested again and put into prison, and that the relevant officials be notified that in the future no releases should occur unless acquittal had been verified in open court. These officials argued incessantly, but in the end compromised and agreed to do so. However, the investigation group believed that the re-arrests proceeded extremely slowly. A week later, only 9 people had been brought back to prison. In a telegram of September 15 from Denby to U.S. Secretary of State Olney it also reflected that “the consul complains of Chinese delays”[28]. Possibly due to differences in narrative perspective, on the 16th, when the Fuzhou General Qingyu and others memorialized about the situation of the British and American consuls observing the trial in Gutian, they said: “The two consuls in court did not interject a single word, and after retiring they also had no objections.”[29] In the Qing government’s reply telegram the next day it said, “Since the consuls observed the trial and signed their names, there is naturally no dissenting view; on the one hand, it is essential to discuss with them the method of closing the case”[30], showing an intention to conclude the case quickly.

Before September 21, the Chinese government had captured 193 people, of whom 43 had been to Huashan. After September 21, comparatively few were captured. The investigation group insisted that there were still more than 100 people implicated, and on the day of its departure from Gutian it still believed that most people were still at large. However, at the same time, on the 21st the U.S. government again reiterated that the government neither sought to measure the extent of harm suffered by its citizens by the number of executions carried out by the Chinese side, nor would it be satisfied with punishing lowly roles who participated in the violence. While firmly demanding that deterrent measures be fully implemented and that compensation be required based on the actual losses suffered by American residents in China, the government’s primary and higher goal was to prevent the recurrence of such injurious incidents[31].

As to sentencing in particular, there were also many disputes between the two sides. On the 21st, Daotai Xu Xingyi told U.S. consul Hixson: “The governor-general requests leniency in sentencing.” However, the British and American side insisted that “all who had been to Huashan must be sentenced one by one, because according to Chinese law they should be put to death.” Denby, in a telegram to U.S. Secretary of State Olney, believed that before verdicts were pronounced, leniency in punishment should not be considered. “The question of clemency after conviction can only be considered after the commissioners have written their report, based on the recommendations of the Chinese government”[32]. On the 24th, Denby in another telegram to Hixson again emphasized: “You only need to let Chinese law proceed according to its own procedures. If under the law the sentence is death or other punishment, then carry it out according to the law. Do not discuss leniency.” This led the Governor-General of Min-Zhe, Bian Baoquan, to complain in telegrams to the governor-general on the 29th and on October 1: “The consul’s intent is never satisfied, obstinately holding to a rule that makes no distinction between principal and accessory among bandits and thieves, and insisting on executing them all.” “With such implicating of persons outside the case, not only will there be no end in sight to concluding it, but it may also provoke other changes.” He believed this was “all because church members, taking the opportunity to avenge seeming enmities, secretly incite matters; the consul is manipulated by their sowing, and is obstinately difficult at every turn”[33].

Not until October 15 did the investigation group show an intention to close the case. Denby reported in two telegrams to Olney that seventeen offenders would be executed in Gutian (bringing the total executed to twenty-three). The Zongli Yamen agreed that all ringleaders must be executed; all participants must be sentenced; and all implicated persons must be interrogated. The British minister’s view was that the committee could probably adjourn before long, leaving subsequent interrogations to be carried out by Chinese courts. “Given that we have closely followed Britain, I think that after Britain gives up the investigation, we should not continue to pursue it.”[34] On the 21st, Gutian again executed 14 offenders. On the 26th, the commissioners departed. On November 7, five people were executed in Fuzhou.

IV. Closing the Case

In November, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Newell made a detailed incident report to the U.S. Department of State in Fuzhou. On November 8, the Governor-General of Min-Zhe, Bian Baoquan, also made a work summary in a memorial titled “Memorial reporting the separate handling and conclusion of the cases of the various offenders in the Gutian Caihui killing of foreigners.” However, although the trial temporarily came to a stage conclusion, the American side still demanded that officials who had been derelict in duty in this incident bear corresponding responsibility. For example, “Newell’s Report” accused the Fujian Gutian County magistrates Wang Yuyang, Wang Rulin, and Yi Jian; commissioner He Ding; former Jianyang County magistrate Li Chunhui; assistant magistrate Li Qizeng; gentry Zeng Guangkui; Fuzhou prefect Qin Bingzhi; expectant salt intendant Tang Baoqian; Daotai Xu Xingyi; customs office supervising officer Chen Daotai; and even the two successive governors-general of Min-Zhe[35]. On the 21st, U.S. Secretary of State Olney emphasized in a telegram to Denby that the Department of State was more concerned with ensuring that Americans would receive security guarantees in the future, and determining the responsibility of the relevant officials for this massacre[36]. Two years later, Sister Bao Jingying, injured in the Gutian Missionary Case, received 1,880 yuan (Mexican silver dollars) in compensation from the Chinese government. But even so, the U.S. government still required that the officials involved at the time “be responsible for the acts of violence committed in the areas under their respective jurisdiction”[37].