Disclaimer: This post was originally written in Chinese and translated into English by GPT-5.2.
[Abstract] By revealing the differences in meaning between the two major categories of interpretations of “有教无类,” this paper raises doubts about the current mainstream interpretation. Under such doubt, the author mainly, through a detailed discussion of the non-mainstream interpretation, proposes the greater likelihood of the non-mainstream interpretation and the author’s re-examination from three aspects: the mainstream interpretation of “有教无类” in ancient annotated editions, its grammatical meaning in Old Chinese, and its relevance to Confucius’ thought.
[Keywords] 有教, 无类, Confucius.
“有教无类” is an important component of Confucius’ thought and is highly general. “有教无类” comes from The Analects · Wei Linggong. Because there is no surrounding context to refer to—only a solitary sentence—there is currently no unified view on how to interpret it. As far as I can see, these views mainly fall into two categories; to put it simply and abstractly, the first category interprets it as “no matter what category, all are given teaching,” and the second category interprets it as “through education, there are no longer categories.” The first view is well known and is a kind of ideology in today’s society. The second view is held by a few scholars and is scarcely known. In this paper, the author will mainly, through a summary and analysis of the second view, propose a re-examination of the interpretation of “有教无类.”
Understanding “有教无类” as “no matter what category, all are given teaching” really does seem, as Nan Huaijin put it, to “need no explanation.” What currently occupies mainstream thought is precisely this type of view. Needless to say, from textbooks in primary, secondary, and tertiary education, to publicity in official and non-official media, to citations in general reading, to ordinary people’s understanding—indeed even in academia—it is almost uniformly unopposed. Yang Bojun translates it as “I educate everyone, with no distinction [of wealth, region, etc.],” Nan Huaijin translates it as “no distinction of class, no distinction of region, no distinction of wisdom or folly; as long as one is willing to be taught…… all are earnestly instructed,” Fu Peirong translates it as “In my teaching I treat everyone equally and do not differentiate among categories of students,” Jin Liangnian translates it as “carrying out education without distinctions among targets”…… To say that “no matter what category, all are given teaching” is today’s ideology—an even more important sign is the statement of the highest official leadership. Taking the Mainland as an example: in August 1958, Mao Zedong spoke of “there being a people’s character in Chinese educational history,” in which “Confucius’ 有教无类” is prominently included, and is even ranked first.
For a scholar, not opposing it in form cannot, of course, be taken as proof that he is wrong; but not opposing it in spirit, and offering only “no explanation is needed,” would inevitably fall short of Confucius’ scholarly admonition of “leaving doubts open.” In fact, the widespread circulation of the first interpretation of “有教无类” is something that occurred after the Republic of China; before that, the second interpretation was the official “standard answer.” This interesting contrast leads the author to offer two possible answers: (1) The first interpretation is correct, because the second is wrong; or because feudal society did not value “the people’s character” and was arbitrary. (2) The second interpretation is correct, because the first is wrong; or because modern society emphasizes “the people’s character” and uses the present to measure the past. But regardless of which of these two possibilities is right or wrong, we must demonstrate it—this is the desirable attitude. In scholarship, one should not be content with “probability” but pursue “certainty.” Even if, after pursuit, one gives a “probabilistic” answer of “I don’t know,” its form is still “certain”—because I “certainly” know “I don’t know,” so I “leave doubts open.” And because the first interpretation “needs no explanation” and in fact has little need for further explanation, the following can only proceed from the possibility of the second interpretation, thereby presenting the author’s view.
To say that the second interpretation was at least before the Republic of China the official “standard answer” is not only well grounded but also has a clear lineage.
Turning to Cheng Shude’s Collected Explanations of the Analects on the interpretation of “有教无类,” we can see the following annotated lineage:
[Textual Variants] In the Han Shu “Treatise on Geography,” “无” is cited as “亡.”
[Textual Proof] Lüshi Chunqiu · Encouraging Learning: Therefore, the teacher’s instruction does not contend over light and heavy, noble and base, poor and rich, but contends over the Way. If the person is acceptable, then nothing about the matter is unacceptable.
[Collected Explanations] Ma says (author’s note: Ma Rong): It means that wherever people are, they see teaching; there are no kinds.
[Ancient Annotations before Tang] The Huang commentary (author’s note: see Huang Kan’s Commentary on the Meaning of the Analects) quotes Miu Bo as saying: The world all knows the purport of this intention to honor teaching, yet does not believe how truly deep this principle is. The kinds of living beings all receive one ultimate [principle]; although even the lowest fools do not change, what transformation moves them is ten thousand times [greater]. If born and hearing the Way, growing and seeing teaching, dwelling in it by the way of benevolence, nurturing it with virtue, beginning and ending with the Way, then as for those not of the Way, that is what I cannot discuss.
[Collected Annotations] (author’s note: see Zhu Xi’s Collected Annotations on the Four Books) Human nature is all good, and the differences among their kinds into good and evil are due to the staining of habituated qi. Therefore, if the superior man provides teaching, then people can all return to goodness, and one should not again discuss their kind’s evil.
From this it can be seen that from Ban Gu to Zhu Xi, the major ancient annotated editions of the Analects almost all understood “有教无类” as: through education, people can “lose categories,” have “no kinds,” “contend over the Way,” “begin and end with the Way,” “return to goodness,” and have no “evil of their kind.” Although the premises or presuppositions of these understandings are not entirely the same—some are “if the person is acceptable,” some are “the kinds of living beings all receive one ultimate [principle],” some are “wherever they are, they see teaching,” some are “human nature is all good”—this does not prevent them from converging by different routes, arriving in form and in an abstract sense at the same conclusion: through education, there are no longer categories.
As is well known, from Zhu Xi onward, the Collected Annotations on the Four Books became the official textbook, and the understanding of “through education, there are no longer categories” naturally became the rigorous “standard answer” for the civil service examinations and the mainstream thought of society. If we verify it in fact, we can see in Deng Qiubai’s General Explanation of the Analects under the entry “有教无类” that later scholars such as Hu Guang, Qingyuan Fuzhang, and the Hong clan, among others, attached themselves and forced correspondences to Zhu Xi’s interpretation. Interestingly, some statements that seem close to the first interpretation are in substance still the second interpretation. As far as I can see, the late-Qing philologist Dai Wang’s interpretation also belongs to the second category: “Teaching people is not based on clan categories, only on their worthiness.” This view, which appears to belong to the first interpretation, is in essence still within the scope of the understanding “if the person is acceptable, then nothing about the matter is unacceptable”; based on the psychological presupposition expressed by Qing scholar Jian Chaoliang, “Teaching has no noble or base—need it be said?” its fundamental purpose still lies in “nothing about the matter is unacceptable,” guiding those who receive teaching toward a comparable status or realm. Thus Dai Wang goes on to cite Xunzi · Royal Regulations to show his understanding of “有教无类”: “In ancient times, if the grandsons of kings and dukes could not be affiliated with ritual and righteousness, then they were placed among the commoners. Even if one was a commoner’s grandson, if he accumulated learning, rectified his person and conduct, and could be affiliated with ritual and righteousness, then he was placed among the ministers and high officials and scholar-officials.” A bit later, Gu Hongming’s English translation of the Analects renders it most directly and without ambiguity: “Among really educated men，there is no caste or race-distinction。” (Among truly educated people, there is no social rank or racial distinction.)
From the examples and argumentation above, we can say: the second interpretation of “有教无类” was the mainstream thought of ancient feudal society—this is no false claim. But this is only a conservative way of putting it. During the Republic of China, how many scholars expounded the interpretation of this sentence, the author does not clearly know. As far as I can see, Hu Shi—who was influenced by European and American habits and advocated democracy, equality, rule of law, and freedom—also stated unambiguously in his September 4, 1947 speech “On Liberalism”: “有教无类, ‘类’ means categories, ranks, nations; ‘有教无类’ means: ‘With education, there are no ranks or nations.’” Of course, the purpose of this paper does not lie in historical textual research or the layering of interpretations; in sum, there is absolutely no doubt that the second interpretation of “有教无类” was once mainstream.
That the mainstream ancient understanding of “有教无类” belongs to the second category is thought-provoking. Of course, we cannot blindly follow the ancients, but to casually deny the ancients’ views does not seem particularly wise. After all, in terms of time and cultural environment, the ancients had advantageous conditions and an atmosphere for understanding and grasping Old Chinese that modern people can hardly experience—let alone the fact that the ancients’ view basically did not change all the way down. In a word, we cannot discard speech because of the speaker, whether modern or ancient. For any view to be established, there must be a rigorous process of argumentation to support it.
Among modern scholars, those who understand “有教无类” as “through education, there are no longer categories,” as far as I can see, include at least Zhang Songhui, Yi Zhongtian, and Shi Yuzhi. These scholars’ interpretations generally proceed from grammatical meaning to give their answers.
In “Another Interpretation of ‘有教无类’,” Zhang Songhui lists three kinds of interpretations of “有教无类”: besides the first and second categories in this paper, he also cites Yuan Zhihong’s article “Explaining ‘无类’ and Also Interpreting ‘有教无类’,” which identifies the meaning as “although there are teachings and commands, there is no good virtue.” Zhang Songhui believes that the word-formation of “无类” is like “无家,” “无家,” merely a predicate-object structure and not, as Wang Guowei said, “an ancient idiom,” and therefore Yuan Zhihong’s view is “far-fetched.” His conclusion is: speaking respectively in terms of “educational targets” and “educational effects,” both the first and second interpretations of “有教无类” are well grounded, “neither violates Confucius’ thought,” thus these two “vague” and “mutually complementary” interpretations “may coexist,” “awaiting further research.” But judging from the ancient annotations he cites throughout and his argumentation about Confucius’ thought, Zhang Songhui is in essence a supporter of the second interpretation. Even if not, we may for the time being regard him as a sort of representative of supporters of the second interpretation.
Starting from the pattern “有…无…,” Yi Zhongtian argues that “有教无类” should be structured like “有备无患,” “有恃无恐,” and therefore should be explained as “有教则无类.” He says:
This pattern has four meanings in Chinese: (1) only a, no b, such as 有勇无谋, 有名无实; (2) there is a, and there is no non-a (b), such as 有增无减, 有过之无不及; (3) both there is a and there is no a, such as 有意无意, 有一搭没一搭; (4) if there is a, then there is no b, such as 有备无患, 有恃无恐. Which one does “有教无类” belong to? The first does not work, because teaching and category are not like courage and strategy, name and reality—two contradictory opposing sides. The second also does not work, for the same reason. The third works even less. The only choice is the fourth, namely “if there is a then there is no b.” For example, with preparation there is no trouble; with reliance there is no fear. Likewise, with teaching there are no categories. “With teaching there are no categories” means that people originally “have categories,” for example some are wise, some foolish; some worthy, some unworthy. But through education these differences can be eliminated. This is called “有教则无类,” abbreviated as “有教无类.” It can be seen that “有教无类” is the result of education, not a premise. This view was put forward by Mr. Xie Zhibin in the 11th issue of Wenshi Zhishi in 1989, and I agree.
According to Yi Zhongtian’s view, we can further argue: because the sentence pattern of “有教无类” has only two structural possibilities, namely “有V (verb) 无N (noun)” and “有N1 无N2.” Among all the visible “有…无…” patterns listed by Yi Zhongtian, the second possible pattern for “有教无类” is excluded because of non-correspondence of word meanings (it does not belong to the paradigms of patterns 1 and 3), and only the first possible pattern, under restrictions of part of speech, can correspond to pattern 4; therefore “有教无类” can only be the “abbreviation” of “有教则无类.”
Zhang Songhui’s statement is only a conjecture, and even he does not dare to draw an absolute conclusion. Yi Zhongtian’s statement is an analogy under generalization, lacking sufficient grounds, and cannot be fully satisfying. The statement that is truly more grounded and persuasive should be that of Shi Yuzhi.
According to Shi Yuzhi, using a possession verb to mark the perfect aspect is a common usage in human languages and has considerable cognitive grounding. This usage is found not only in foreign languages such as English, French, Swedish, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, etc., but also in Old Chinese, in some present-day dialects (such as Hakka, Min dialects, Cantonese, etc.), and even in some usages of Modern Chinese. Following Shi Yuzhi’s basic exposition, the author may say: for example, in English “I have ate dinner,” in the author’s hometown dialect (a Min dialect) “我有吃饭,” in Modern Chinese “某某有言” “有失XX (face, respect, etc.),” and so on, all belong to the usage of adding “有” before verb V to express a perfect-aspect concept. This usage is very common in Old Chinese. For example, Book of Songs · Didi “女子有行，远父母兄弟” should, as Shi Yuzhi does, be translated as “The girl has married, [and] is far from her parents and brothers”; Book of Songs · Jimin “子兴视夜，星河有烂” should, as Shi Yuzhi does, be translated as “Rising at night to look at the sky, the stars are already shining.” In fact, The Analects also contains evidence of this usage. The Analects · Gongye Chang “子路有闻，未能之行，唯恐有闻” clearly tells us that “有闻” is a completed action, with a semantic temporal relation of precedence to the subsequent action “行,” and indeed belongs to the “有+V” perfect-aspect marking usage. Another example is The Analects · Taibo: “巍巍乎其有成功也！焕乎其有文章！” If these two sentences are not understood as “Yao accomplished achievements, established institutions and regulations; only then were his achievements vast and his institutions and regulations splendid,” they cannot be explained.
Some may say that in the structure “有+V,” V is actually a nominalized V, i.e., a gerund, so it should count as a noun N. This has some validity, but it lacks a clear understanding of the relationship between verbs and nouns and of the use of the character “教” in The Analects.
First, the relationship between nouns and verbs. Shi Yuzhi’s book Symmetry and Asymmetry of Affirmation and Negation uses two important concepts—“discrete quantity” and “continuous quantity”—to develop its discussion. Simply put, a discrete quantity is like the natural numbers 1, 2, 3….. each element is not absolutely continuous with the next; represented on the number line they are just discrete points, and the set of these numbers is merely the simple superposition of these points. A continuous quantity is like all positive numbers greater than 0; represented on the number line by a line segment, it has absolute continuity, and the set of these numbers can only be expressed by inequalities. Shi Yuzhi says: “Nouns have only discreteness and no continuity; the most typical feature of verbs is discreteness, while also possessing continuity.” Therefore nouns and verbs “can both be negated by the discrete-quantity negator ‘没’ (Modern Chinese),” and can also be affirmed by the discrete-quantity affirmer ‘有’ (Old Chinese), which accords with the analogical effect of language development; it is just that this analogical effect, in time, due to various constraints, is asymmetric. For example, we now say “I succeeded” corresponds to the negation “I didn’t succeed”; then, in Old Chinese, “I succeeded” could be expressed as “我有成(功)” (Confucius often said “三年有成”), but the relationship in usage between “I didn’t succeed” and “我有成(功)” is non-synchronic. In the sentence “I didn’t succeed,” we might seem able to treat “success” as a noun, but in fact here “succeed” can only be a verb, because in this sentence we cannot add the perfect marker “了” to emphasize, nor can we add modifiers to “succeed,” so here “succeed” can only be a verb. For example, we can say “I have no pocket money anymore,” “I don’t have much pocket money,” but we can never say “I didn’t succeed anymore,” “I didn’t have a great success,” because “pocket money” is a noun, while “succeed” is not. This point is the same for using a possession verb to mark the perfect aspect. Taking residual usages in Modern Chinese as examples: we can say “This made me gain face,” but we cannot say “This made me have-lost face-了.” We can say “Confucius has many words,” but we cannot say “Confucius has many says.”
By searching The Analects, we find that the character “教” in The Analects is used as a verb in every instance, without exception; that is, in Confucius’ time or in Confucius’ “dictionary,” “教” was not used as a noun. The “教” in “有教无类” should all the more not be treated otherwise. Sentences in The Analects containing “教” are as follows:
举善而教不能 (Weizheng)
子以四教(人) (Shuer)
教之 (Zilu)
善人教民七年 (ibid.)
以不教民战 (ibid.)
不教而杀谓之虐 (Yao Yue)
In sum, we have almost absolute confidence in identifying the “有教” in “有教无类” as belonging to the usage of a possession verb marking the perfect aspect; it should, like Gu Hongming’s English translation “educated,” be translated as “has been taught.” Then we also have almost absolute confidence in identifying that “有教无类” can only be translated as “through education, there are no longer categories.” What is more, if “教” were used as a noun, it would not fit the currently observed patterns “有N无N” or “有N1无N2,” would it?
Confucius’ thought has an evident notion of categories. Concepts such as benevolence, righteousness, rites, wisdom, trustworthiness, learning; upper, middle, lower; petty person, gentleman, sage, etc., are clear evidence. In fact, the notion of categories is something everyone has; the claim of no distinctions and no categories is, from the beginning, using a thought of distinctions and categories to negate distinctions and categories—just as Sartre said, self-deception is simply using what one believes to induce oneself not to believe. That is to say, it is self-evident that Confucius did not deny that people have categorical differences.
In the author’s view, Confucius’ understanding of human categorical differences mainly has four aspects: (1) differences of status (noble and base), (2) differences of morality (good and evil), (3) differences of intelligence (upper wisdom and lower folly), and (4) differences of ethnicity (barbarians and the Xia). And according to Confucius’ thought, these four kinds of differences can, to a certain extent, be blurred. For example, differences in status can be blurred through “study well and then enter office”; differences in morality can be blurred through learning doctrines such as benevolence and rites; differences in intelligence can be blurred through methods such as “learn and thereby know” or “be perplexed and thereby know”; differences in ethnicity can be blurred through Confucius’ political measure of “achieving results in three years.” In fact, Confucius’ teaching method of “teaching in accordance with aptitude” itself has a mosaic-like blurring function.
Yi Zhongtian and Shi Yuzhi both believe “无类” means “eliminating categorical differences.” The author does not think so, and believes that understanding “无类” as “blurring categorical differences” rather than “eliminating categorical differences” is more likely to accord with Confucius’ original intent. As with the four differences mentioned above, they are simply impossible to eliminate, but they can be blurred. Differences cannot be eliminated, just as self-deception cannot be eliminated. But under the effect of blurring, people can forget differences, as if reaching Zhuangzi’s realm of “depending on nothing,” entering a world where differences do not matter. This is like when, under innocence or other mysterious forces, people can sit in forgetfulness of everything, and self-deception does not matter either.
The author’s interpretation is not to “invoke antiquity to change institutions” so as to make it easier for others to accept; rather, the facts should be so. First, because Confucius’ concept of categories itself is a fuzzy concept, without strict demarcation or definition, so “无类” can only express a fuzzy concept. Second, for example, Confucius’ advocated “middle virtue,” his practiced “exhausting both ends by probing them,” his view that “going too far is as bad as not going far enough,” and all of Confucius’ doctrines—like the repeatedly discussed justice in The Republic, and the Dao that Laozi says again and again yet cannot make clear—are all fuzzy concepts without exception. Fuzzy concepts are not something shameful; even formal science and “absolutely correct” mathematics developed in 1965, by the American cybernetics expert Zadeh, the branch of “fuzzy sets” (fuzzy set), which sparked a revolution in the mathematical community. As for the mechanism of forming human concepts, there are many uncertainties and random factors; constrained by the contingent conjunction of signifier and signified in linguistic signs, constrained by the “innate” subjectivity and fuzziness inherent in linguistic semantics, human concepts cannot possibly be not fuzzy. What is more, Confucius’ doctrines belong to “matters and principles,” not “physical principles.” From this perspective, we then understand that Confucius’ “有教无类” is merely one of his ultimate educational ideals. This ideal, as The Great Learning states at the outset, lies in “stopping at the utmost goodness”! “Stopping at the utmost goodness,” analyzed in terms of semantic context, has rich connotations, not limited to good and evil, but also including the quality of social mores; and in its abstract fuzzy sense, it is in fact exactly like the statement “有教无类,” and also accords well with the Confucian tendency toward “being settled on the One” and grand unification (“rites, music, punitive expeditions come from the Son of Heaven”).
Understanding this, we can also understand that what today’s Chinese educational circles most emphasize—comprehensive development of “morality, intelligence, physical fitness, aesthetics, and labor”—is fundamentally a modern version of “有教无类”! Because the original intent of comprehensive development in “morality, intelligence, physical fitness, aesthetics, and labor” is not to make all students’ levels in these aspects uniform, as if stamped from a mold, but to enable them all to have a certain level in these aspects. When everyone’s “morality, intelligence, physical fitness, aesthetics, and labor” reaches a comparable level, it is not that there is absolutely no difference in levels, but that the difference is no longer important and need not be mentioned—just as among sages there is no comparison. So in essence, it is still in the same line as Confucius’ idea of “through education, blurring the categorical differences among those educated,” and is an ultimate educational ideal.
Some may raise the point that Confucius had three thousand disciples, coming from all social strata and family backgrounds, and that Confucius himself said “From those who bring even a bundle of dried meat, I have never withheld instruction,” showing that Confucius indeed “no matter what category, all are given teaching”; thus, his “有教无类” is hard to say is not the first interpretation. Yang Bojun’s translation and notes determine it this way. However, the author does not think so, for the following reasons:
If we say that different social classes and family backgrounds lead people from “natures are similar” to develop into “habits are far apart,” thereby producing the difference whereby Confucius was versatile while disciples were like vessels (single in ability), producing the differentiation that disciples each had strengths in “virtue and conduct, speech, government affairs, literature,” producing differences such as “Chai is dull, Shen is slow, Shi is biased, You is crude” (both of the preceding examples are found in the “Xianjin” chapter), then under the teaching premise of “no matter what category, all are given teaching,” Confucius would also have the teaching goal of “through education, there are no longer categories.” This is a highly targeted and very natural result, and in fact Confucius did exactly this.
Did Confucius truly achieve “no matter what category, all are given teaching”? The author’s answer is no. According to the principle of fuzzy concepts, “no matter what category” here of course cannot be understood as “everyone” in the universal sense—this is impossible. Therefore, the minimum limit of understanding “no matter what category” should be discussed under the premise of being able to afford the “bundle of dried meat.” If under this minimum standard Confucius still could not treat everyone equally and not classify, then we must say: as long as Confucius had self-awareness and was relatively realistic and worldly-wise, he would not likely say something like “no matter what category, all are given teaching.” Confucius said “Only the benevolent can love people and can hate people,” and he himself, without yielding, believed “I desire benevolence and benevolence arrives,” showing that deep down he regarded himself as benevolent. A Confucius who regarded himself as benevolent, when “hating” people, could declare of Ran Qiu, “He is not of my followers,” and encourage “the young men to beat the drum and attack him” (Xianjin); could, in front of Yuan Rang, curse “Young and not respectful, grown and with no achievements, old and not dead—this is a thief,” and “strike his shin with a staff” (Xianwen); could, in front of other disciples, curse Zai Wo as “rotten wood” and “wall of dung” (Gongye Chang); could feign illness to avoid seeing Ru Bei and deliberately let him know he was feigning illness (Yanghuo). How can one say he had the magnanimity of “no matter what category, all are given teaching”? Moreover, Confucius was highly principled: he did not speak of “strange phenomena, feats of strength, disorder, and spirits,” did not speak of “nature and Heaven’s mandate,” did not discuss “military affairs,” did not learn “farming and gardening arts.” With his individual power, how could he possibly “no matter what category, all are given teaching”? Conversely, if Confucius’ actions and his teaching in accordance with aptitude were to guide disciples toward some direction, would that not be more appropriate?
Jian Chaoliang says “Teaching has no noble or base—need it be said?” We should also say: if Confucius truly achieved “no matter what category, all are given teaching,” then also “need it be said”?
Synthesizing the analysis of the whole paper, at this point, for the first interpretation of “有教无类” to stand up, one must provide a coherent refutation of the analysis above. In the absence of a refutation with sufficient reasons, according to academia’s old precedent of “good money drives out bad,” the second interpretation should be regarded as correct.
In sum, through an exploration of Confucius’ thought, the author has a fairly large degree of confidence in assigning “有教无类” to the second interpretation. Retreating a step, it should also be a mixture of the first and the second interpretations. That “有教无类” contains the second interpretation should not be wrong.
Linear programming is an important mathematical method and thinking tool, widely applied in operations research. Its basic idea can be put like this: through the encirclement of linear constraints one by one, it strictly delimits the possible range of the feasible region on the coordinate axes in the form of a functional model, and finally obtains the optimal solution within the feasible region. On the philosophical level, it is to use the “certain” form to strictly delimit the possibilities of the “probable,” and continuously, through repeated “certain” delimitation of the “probable,” to obtain the “certain” optimal solution from among the “probable” possibilities. This is also the basic argumentative approach of this paper:
From the usage characteristics of all inductively possible “有…无…” patterns, the basic rule in Old Chinese grammar of using a possession verb to mark the perfect aspect, and the actual usage of the character “教” in The Analects, the author concludes: we have almost absolute confidence in identifying “有教无类” as belonging to the second interpretation, namely the meaning “through education, there are no longer categories.” At least before the Republic of China, the ancients’ main annotated opinions on “有教无类” basically can all be regarded as the second interpretation, and this does not seem accidental. Through investigating Confucius’ thought, we can further, with more confidence and more grounding, point out that “有教无类” is fundamentally the “Way of Great Learning” of “stopping at the utmost goodness,” not only highly consistent with Confucius’ basic thought, but also something Confucius basically practiced. Therefore we hold that, besides interpreting “有教无类” as “through education, there are no longer categories,” there is nothing more reasonable than this. Of course, from the perspective of formal science, we cannot deny the slight possibility of the first interpretation, namely “no matter what category, all are given teaching”; it is just that this possibility belongs to a “possibility that is basically impossible,” lacking sufficient theoretical support.
In this paper’s exploration, the author uses the notion of fuzzy concepts to clarify the biased understanding or expression among the main supporters of the second interpretation regarding “无类,” namely the view that “无类” should not be understood as “eliminating categorical differences,” but should be understood as “blurring categorical differences.” This not only accords with Confucius’ basic thought; it should also be the most practical understanding. Therefore it can be said: “有教无类,” as Confucius’ ultimate educational ideal, is no different from today’s Chinese educational ideal. Yet for Confucius, with the power of one person, under the conditions of his time, to outline the basic direction of his ultimate educational ideal, to summarize it by the highly general “有教无类,” and to practice it in actual teaching, was extremely difficult. In terms of its actual achievements, the “有教无类” Confucius upheld not only exerted important influence at the time, but even now its lingering radiance and positive significance can still be seen everywhere. From this it can be seen that Confucius’ titles of “great educator” and “first-rate educator” are, from whatever angle, fully deserved.
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